The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been shown recently that finding a successful manipulation for an agent is an NP-hard problem [ABLM17]. Conversely, it is also known that finding an optimal manipulation can be solved in polynomial time in a few cases: if there are only two agents or if the manipulator has a binary or a lexicographic utility function. In this work, we take a parameterized approach to provide several new complexity results on this manipulation problem. Notably, we show that finding an optimal manipulation can be performed in polynomial time if the number of agents is a constant and that it is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to a parameter measuring the distance between the preference rankings of the agents. Moreover, we provide an integer program and a dynamic programming scheme to solve the manipulation problem and we show that a single manipulator can increase the utility of her bundle by a multiplicative factor which is at most 2. Overall, our results show that manipulating the sequential allocation protocol can be performed efficiently for a wide range of instances.
Introduction
Allocating resources to a set of agents in an efficient and fair manner is one of the most fundamental problems in computational social choice. One challenging case is the allocation of indivisible items [BCM16, BEF03, LMMS04], e.g., allocating players to teams. To address this problem, the sequential allocation mechanism has lately received increasing attention in the AI literature [AWX15, AKWX16, BL11, KNW13, KNWX13, LS12] . This mechanism works as follows: at each time step an agent, selected according to a predefined sequence, is allowed to pick one item among the remaining ones. Such a protocol has many desirable qualities: it is simple, it can be run both in a centralized and in a decentralized way, and agents do not have to submit cardinal utilities. For these reasons, sequential allocation is used in several real life applications, as for instance by several professional sports associations [BSJ79] to organize their draft systems (e.g., the annual draft of the National Basketball Association in the US), and by the Harvard Business School to allocate courses to students [BC07] .
Unfortunately, it is well known that the sequential allocation protocol is not strategy-proof. Stated otherwise, an agent can obtain a better allocation by not obeying her preferences, and this might lead to unfair allocations for the truthful agents [BL11] . Such a drawback has motivated the algorithmic study of several issues related to strategic behaviors in the sequential allocation setting, the most important one being the computation of a "successful" manipulation. Hopefully, if finding a successful manipulation is computationally too difficult, then agents may be inclined to behave truthfully [Wal16] .
Related work on strategic behaviors in the sequential allocation setting. Aziz et al. [AGW17] studied the sequential allocation setting by treating it as a one shot game. They notably designed a linear-time algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium and a polynomialtime algorithm to compute an optimal Stackelberg strategy when there are two agents, a leader and a follower, and the follower has a constant number of distinct values for the items. If the sequential allocation setting is seen as finite repeated game with perfect information, Kalinowski et al. [KNWX13] showed that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be computed in linear time when there are two players. However, with more agents, the authors showed that computing one of the possibly exponentially many equilibria is PSPACE-hard.
Several papers focused on the complexity of finding a successful manipulation for a given agent, also called manipulator. Bouveret and Lang [BL11] showed that determining if there exists a strategy for the manipulator to get a specific set of items can be done in polynomial time. Moreover, Aziz et al. [ABLM17] showed that finding if there exists a successful manipulation, whatever the utility function of the manipulator, is a polynomial-time problem. Conversely, the same authors showed that determining an optimal manipulation (for a specific utility function) is an NP-hard problem. Bouveret and Lang [BL14] provided further hardness results for finding an optimal manipulation for the cases of non-additive preferences and coalitions of manipulators. On the other hand, finding an optimal manipulation can be performed in polynomial time if the manipulator has lexicographic or binary utilities [ABLM17, BL14] or if there are only two agents [BL14] . Tominaga et al. [TTY16] further showed that finding an optimal manipulation is a polynomial-time problem when there are only two agents and the picking sequence is composed of a sequence of randomly generated rounds. More precisely, in each round, both agents get to pick one item and a coin flip determines who picks first.
Our contribution. In this work, we provide several new results on the problem of finding an optimal manipulation. Most of our results are positive parameterized complexity ones based on a dynamic programming algorithm. Maybe most importantly, we show that this manipulation problem can be solved in polynomial time if the number of agents is constant and that it is Fixed-Parameter Tractable (FPT) w.r.t. the maximum range of an item, a parameter measuring how close the preference rankings of the agents are. Moreover, we provide an integer programming formulation of the problem and show that the manipulator cannot increase the utility of her bundle by a multiplicative factor greater than or equal to 2, this bound being tight.
Setting and Notations
We consider a set A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } of n agents and a set I = {i 1 , . . . , i m } of m items. A preference profile P = {≻ a 1 , . . . , ≻ an } describes the preferences of the agents. More precisely, P is a collection of rankings such that ranking ≻ a specifies the preferences of agent a over the items in I. The items are allocated to the agents according to the following sequential allocation procedure: at each time step, a picking sequence π ∈ A m specifies an agents who gets to pick an item within the remaining ones. Put another way, π(1) picks first, then π(2) picks second, and so forth. We assume that agents behave greedily by choosing at each time step their preferred item within the remaining ones. If we view sequential allocation as a centralized protocol, then all agents report their preference rankings to a central authority which mimics this picking process. In the following, w.l.o.g. we use this centralized viewpoint where agents have to report their preference rankings. This sequential process leads to an allocation that we denote by φ. More formally, φ is a function such that φ(a) is the set of items that agent a has obtained at the end of the sequential allocation process.
Example 1 (from [ABLM17] ). For the sake of illustration, we consider an instance with 3 agents and 4 items, i.e., A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 }. The preferences of the agents are described by the following profile:
and the picking sequence is π = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 1 ). Then, a 1 will first pick i 1 , then a 2 will pick i 3 , a 3 will pick i 2 , and lastly a 1 will pick i 4 . Hence, the resulting allocation is given by
The allocation φ is completely determined by the picking sequence π and the preference profile P . Notably, if one of the agents reports a different preference ranking, she may obtain a different set of items. This different set may even be more desirable to her. Consequently, agents may have an incentive to misreport their preferences.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued). Assume now that agent a 1 reports the preference ranking i 3 ≻ i 2 ≻ i 1 ≻ i 4 . Then she obtains the set of items φ(a 1 ) = {i 2 , i 3 }. This set of items may be more desirable to a 1 than {i 1 , i 4 } if for instance items i 1 , i 2 and i 3 are almost as desirable as one another, but are all three much more desirable than i 4 .
In this work, we study this type of manipulation. We will assume that agent a 1 is the manipulator and that all other ones behave truthfully. Although the agents are asked to report ordinal preferences, we will assume a standard assumption in the literature that a 1 has underlying additive utilities for the items. More formally, the preferences of a 1 over items in I are described by a set of positive values U = {u(i)|i ∈ I} such that i ≻ a 1 j implies u(i) > u(j). The utility of a set of items S is then obtained by summation, i.e., u(S) = i∈S u(i). We will denote by ≻ T the truthful preference ranking of a 1 , and by φ ≻ the allocation obtained if agent a 1 reports the preference ranking ≻. Moreover, we will denote by u T the value u(φ ≻ T (a 1 )) which is the utility value of a 1 's allocation when she behaves truthfully. We will say that a preference ranking ≻ is a successful manipulation if a 1 prefers φ ≻ (a 1 ) to φ ≻ T (a 1 ), i.e., if u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) > u T . Hence, the objective for the manipulator is to find a successful manipulation ≻ maximizing u(φ ≻ (a 1 )). We are now ready to define formally the problem of Manipulating a Sequential Allocation process, called ManipSA.
ManipSA
Input: A set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } of n agents where a 1 is the manipulator, a set I = {i 1 , . . . , i m } of m items, a picking sequence π, a preference profile P and a set U of utility values for a 1 .
Find: a preference ranking ≻ maximizing u(φ ≻ (a 1 )).
The ManipSA problem is known to be NP -hard [ABLM17] . In this work, we will address this optimization problem from a parameterized complexity point of view. We will be mostly interested in three types of parameters: the number of agents, the number of items that an agent gets to pick, and the range of the items. While the number of agents n is already clear, let us define the other parameters more formally. We denote by µ(a) the number of items that agent a gets to choose in π and by µ max the maximum of these values, i.e., µ max = max{µ(a)|a ∈ A}. Let rk a (i) denote the rank of item i in the preference ranking of agent a. Then, we define the range rg(i) of an item i as:
Note that we define the range of an item using only non-manipulators. The maximum range of an item rg max is then defined as max i∈I rg(i). In this work, we obtain the following results on the ManipSA problem:
• Section 3 shows that ManipSA is in XP w.r.t. parameter µ(a 1 ). However, we obtain that even determining if a successful manipulation exists is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter µ max .
• In Section 4, we prove that ManipSA is in XP w.r.t. parameter n by designing a dynamic programming scheme to solve ManipSA. We also show that the proposed approach leads to FPT results for parameters n + µ(a 1 ), n + rg max and rg max alone.
• In Section 5, we show that the manipulator cannot increase the utility of her bundle by a multiplicative factor greater than or equal to 2, this bound being tight.
• Lastly, in Section 6, we design an integer program for the ManipSA problem. This integer program provides another tool to solve the ManipSA problem which may be used to obtain insights on the problem, e.g., by analysing thoroughly the solution polytope.
3 ManipSA and Parameters µ(a 1 ) and µ max : a Hardness Result
The most simple approach to solve the ManipSA problem is probably to try the m! possible preference rankings and see which one yields the maximum utility value. However, a more clever approach can use the following result from [BL11]:
Fact 1 (From Propositions 7 and 8 in [BL11] ). Given a specific set of items S, it can be determined in polynomial time if there exists a preference ranking ≻ such that S ⊆ φ ≻ (a 1 ). In such case, it is also easy to compute such a ranking.
Hence, one can try the m µ(a 1 ) possible sets of µ(a 1 ) items to determine which is the best one that a 1 can get. This approach shows that ManipSA is in XP w.r.t. parameter µ(a 1 ).
Example 3 (Example 1 continued). In our running example, µ(a 1 ) = 2. Hence, a 1 just has to determine which one of the 4 2 following sets she must obtain: {a 1 , a 2 }, {a 1 , a 3 }, {a 1 , a 4 }, {a 2 , a 3 }, {a 2 , a 4 }, {a 3 , a 4 }.
One could hope for a more positive result, as an FPT algorithm w.r.t. µ(a 1 ). However, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 1. Determining if there exists a successful manipulation for a 1 is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter µ max .
Proof. We sketch here the main ideas of the proof but note that we provide a complete version of it in Appendix A.1. We make a reduction from the CLIQUE problem where given a graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, we wish to determine if there exists a clique of size k. This problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter k. W.l.o.g., we make the assumptions that |V | > k and that |E| > k(k − 1)/2 (because otherwise it is trivial to determine if there is a clique of size k). From an instance of CLIQUE, we create the following ManipSA instance.
Set of items. We create two items, g {i,j} (a good item) and w {i,j} (one of the worst items), for each edge {i, j} ∈ E and two items, b i (one of the best items) and m i (a medium item), for each vertex i ∈ V . Put another way, I = {g {i,j} , w {i,j} |{i, j} ∈ E} ∪ {b i , m i |i ∈ V } and the number of items is thus |I| = 2|V | + 2|E|.
Set of agents.
We create one agent e {i,j} for each edge {i, j} ∈ E and one agent v i for each vertex i ∈ V . The top of e {i,j} 's ranking is g {i,j} ≻ m i ≻ m j ≻ w {i,j} (which one of m i or m j is ranked first can be chosen arbitrarily). The top of v i 's ranking is b i ≻ m i . We also create |V | − k − 1 agents c t for t ∈ {1, . . . , |V | − k − 1} (whose role is to collect medium items) such that the top of the ranking of each c t is m 1 ≻ m 2 . . . ≻ m |V | . Last, the manipulator, that we denote by a 1 to be consistent with the rest of the paper, has the following preferences: he first ranks items b i , then items g {i,j} , then items m i and last items w {i,j} . To
Picking sequence. The picking sequence π is composed of the following rounds:
• Manipulator round 1: a 1 gets to pick k items.
• Vertex round: each agent v i gets to pick one item.
• Manipulator round 2: a 1 gets to pick k(k − 1)/2 items.
• Edge round: each agent e {i,j} gets to pick one item.
• Medium item collectors round: each agent c t gets to pick one item.
• Manipulator round 3: a 1 gets to pick one item.
• End round: the remaining items can be shared arbitrarily within the non-manipulators such that each of them gets at most one new item.
Utility values of a 1 . For ease of presentation, we will act as if there were only four different utility values, even if a 1 is asked to report a complete preference order. In the complete proof provided in Appendix A.1, we use a similar utility function with sufficiently small ǫ values to make preferences strict. In this sketch of proof, each item b i has utility 4. Each item g {i,j} has utility 3. Each item m i has utility 2. Lastly, items w {i,j} have utility 1. In this simplified setting, we set ≻ T as being one specific ranking consistent with the utility values of a 1 and we wish to determine if there exists another ranking yielding a strictly higher utility.
Sketch of the proof. At the end of the vertex round, all the best items are gone, as they have already been picked by a 1 or by the vertex agents v i . Similarly, at the end of the edge round, none of the good items are left. Hence, at the third manipulator round, when a 1 picks her last item, the best she can hope for is a medium item. Consequently, the maximum utility she might achieve is accomplished by picking k best items in her first round, k(k − 1)/2 good items in her second round, and finally a medium item in her third round, for an overall utility of 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 2. Note that she can always pick any set of k best items in her first round and then (whatever the previous k best items) pick any set of k(k − 1)/2 good items in her second round. Hence obtaining an overall utility of 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 1 is always possible. Note also that, if {b i 1 , . . . , b i k } are the k best items selected by a 1 at the first round, then in the vertex round the vertex agents {v i 1 , . . . , v i k } will pick the medium items {m i 1 , . . . , m i k }. Moreover, before the third manipulator round, agents c t will pick additional |V | − k − 1 medium items. So, a medium item is left at the third manipulator round only if none of the edge agents picks a medium item in the edge round. According to her preference ranking, any such agent e {i,j} will not pick a medium item iff g {i,j} is still available, or if g {i,j} , m i and m j have all already been picked. If g {i,j} is one of the k(k − 1)/2 good items that have been already picked at the manipulator second round, then m i and m j have already been picked before by v i and v j in the vertex round, if b i and b j were already taken in the first manipulator round. In conclusion, none of the medium items are picked by the edge agents iff the k(k − 1)/2 edges e {i,j} for which g {i,j} has already been picked at the second manipulator round have as endpoints only nodes in {v i 1 , . . . , v i k }, and this is possible iff {v i 1 , . . . , v i k } forms a clique in the initial graph G. Summarizing, there exists a strategy for a 1 achieving an overall utility of 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 2 iff G has a clique of k nodes. It remains to show that we could solve the CLIQUE problem if we could determine if there exists a successful manipulation. This fact results from the following disjunction of two cases: If u T = 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 2, then we can conclude that there exists a clique of size k; Otherwise, if u T = 4k + 3k(k − 1)/2 + 1, then there exists a clique of size k iff there exists a successful manipulation for a 1 .
Remark: Aziz et al. [ABLM17] considered a sequential allocation setting in which the manipulator has a binary utility function but is asked to provide a complete preference order. In this setting, the manipulation problem consists in finding a ranking maximizing the utility of the bundle she gets. While the authors showed that this problem can be solved in polynomial time, the reduction used in the sketch of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that this problem is NP-hard if the manipulator has a utility function involving four different values (instead of two).
One consequence of Theorem 1 is that it is unlikely that the ManipSA problem admits an FPT algorithm w.r.t. parameter µ(a 1 ). In the next section, we provide more positive results w.r.t other parameters of this manipulation problem.
Positive Parameterized Complexity Results
We first design a dynamic programming scheme for the ManipSA problem. We will then explain how this scheme entails several positive parameterized complexity results.
A Dynamic Programming Scheme
Our dynamic programming approach considers pairs (k, S) where S ⊆ I and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , µ(a 1 )}. In a state characterized by the pair (k, S), we know that the items in S have been picked by some agents in A as well as k other items that have been picked by agent a 1 . However, while the items in S are clearly identified, the identities of these k other items are unspecified.
Given a pair (k, S) the number of items that have already been picked is |S| + k. Hence, the next agent to become a picker is π(|S| + k + 1). Let us denote this agent by a. If a = a 1 , i.e., she is the manipulator, then she will pick one more item within the set I \ S and we move to state (k + 1, S). Otherwise, let b(a, S) denote the preferred item of agent a within the set I \ S. Then, two cases are possible:
• either b(a, S) has already been picked by agent a 1 . In this case, we move to state (k − 1, S ∪ {b(a, S)}). Note that this is only possible if k was greater than or equal to one.
• otherwise b(a, S) is picked by agent a and we move to state (k, S ∪ {b(a, S)}).
Let us denote by V (k, S) the maximal utility that the manipulator can get from items in I \ S starting from state (k, S). Then the value of an optimal manipulation is given by V (k = 0, S = ∅). From the previous analysis, function V verifies the following dynamic programming equations:
The termination is guaranteed by the facts that V (−1, S) = −∞, ∀S ⊆ I and that V (k, S) = i∈I\S u(i) when |S| + k = m. By standard bookkeeping techniques one can identify the items that are taken in an optimal manipulation and the order in which they are taken and then recover an optimal ranking to report (where these items are ranked first and in the same order). Before analyzing the complexity of this dynamic programming scheme, we illustrate it on our running example.
Example 4 (Example 1 continued). Let us illustrate our approach on our running example. We let u(i 1 ) = 5, u(i 2 ) = 4, u(i 3 ) = 3 and u(i 4 ) = 1. We show in Figure 1 the directed acyclic state graph of the dynamic programming algorithm. The values of the states are given next to them and the optimal branches are displayed with thick solid arrows. As we can see the optimal choices for a 1 is to first pick i 3 so that i 2 is still available the second time she becomes the picker. Hence an optimal manipulation is given by
a 1 has picked i 2 , i 4 a 1 has picked i 4 a 1 has picked i 2 a 2 picks i 3 a 1 has picked i 3 a 3 picks i 1 a 1 has picked i 1 a 2 picks i 4 a 3 picks i 2 a 3 picks i 1 
Complexity of the Dynamic Programming Scheme
We now provide positive parameterized complexity results by proving several bounds on the number of states involved in the dynamic programming scheme described above.
The algorithm is XP w.r.t. parameter n. Let D(a, i) denote the set of items that agent a prefers to item i, i.e., D(a, i) = {j ∈ I|j ≻ a i}. Then, for any set S ⊆ I, the definition of b(a, S), which we recall is the preferred element of agent a in set I \ S implies that a∈A\{a 1 } D(a, b(a, S)) ⊆ S. Let us denote by ∆ the set of sets for which the equality holds, i.e., ∆ = {S ⊆ I| a∈A\{a 1 } D(a, b(a, S)) = S}. Note that a set S ∈ ∆ is completely determined by the vector (b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)) and thus |∆| ≤ m n−1 . Our first key insight is that all the sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme belong to ∆.
Lemma 1. For all pairs (k, S) involved in our dynamic programming scheme, we have that S belongs to ∆.
Proof. The result follows simply by induction. The result is true for the initial state in which S = ∅. Assume that the result is true for a state characterized by a pair (k, S). We show that the result also holds for the successor states. If π(|S| + k + 1) = a 1 , then the successor state is (k + 1, S) so the result is also true for this new state as S is unchanged. Otherwise, let π(|S| + k + 1) = a * , then the successor states are (k, S ∪ {b(a * , S)}) and (k − 1, S ∪ {b(a * , S)}). Then we have the following two inclusion relationships:
These relationships imply that:
where the first equality is due to the induction hypothesis. As already stated, the reverse inclusion relationship is always true and hence S ∪ {b(a * , S)} ∈ ∆.
Consequently from Lemma 1, each state of the dynamic program admits two possible representations that we will denote by agent representation and item representation. In the item representation, a state (k, S) is represented by a vector of size m + 1, i.e., S is represented by a binary vector of size m. In the agent representation, a state (k, S) is represented by a vector of size n. In this case, S is replaced by the vector (b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)). Note that processing a state (computing the succesor states and the value of the state) in the agent representation (resp. item representation) can be done in O(nm) (resp. O(m)) operations. We now show that the ManipSA problem can be solved in polynomial time for any bounded number of agents. Indeed, the problem is in XP w.r.t. parameter n.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that our dynamic programming scheme runs in O(n · m n+1 ). To obtain this complexity bound, one should use the agent representation. In this case, processing a state requires O(nm) operations, and one can use a dynamic programming table of size m n to run the dynamic program. More precisely, this table has one cell for each possible vector (k, b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)).
We now argue that our dynamic programming approach yields an FPT algorithm w.r.t. parameters n + µ(a 1 ), n + rg max and rg max by providing tighter bounds on the number of sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme. To use these bounds, we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Under the item representation, the directed acyclic state graph of our dynamic program can be build in O(mS 2 ), where S denotes the number of states involved in our dynamic programming scheme.
Proof. First note that the directed state graph, i.e., the graph where each state is connected to its successor states is indeed acyclic. Indeed, given a state that can occur at timestep t of the allocation process (i.e., k + |S| = t), its successors will either correspond to timestep t + 1 or will still correspond to timestep t but with a strictly lower value for parameter k. We now show how to incrementally build the directed acyclic state graph from state (k = 0, S = {}). For each new state generated at the previous iteration of the method, compute its successor states, add edges towards them, and label them with the corresponding utility values. Moreover, each time a state is generated, compare it to the states already generated to remove duplicates. If it is indeed a new state, its successors will be computed in the next iteration. This step is repeated until we have generated all states. Note that because each state is only processed once, we will generate at most 2S states. However, because of the duplicate removal operation performed each time a state is generated, the method runs in O(mS 2 ). Indeed, this step will trigger O(S 2 ) comparisons, each requiring m + 1 operations.
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + µ(a 1 ). We further argue that the number of different sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme can be upper bounded by m(µ(a 1 ) + 1) n−1 . This is a consequence of the following lemma, where µ(a, t) denotes the number of items that agent a gets to pick within the t first time steps.
Lemma 3. For each time step t, there is a set S t of t − µ(a 1 , t) items that are always picked within the t first time steps, whatever the actions of the manipulator.
Sketch of the proof. Given an instance J of the ManipSA problem, consider the instance J −a 1 obtained from J by removing a 1 . Moreover, let us denote by S −a 1 t the set of items picked at the end of the t th time step in J −a 1 . This set of size t is clearly defined as all agents behave truthfully in J −a 1 . We argue that after t time steps in J , all items in S −a 1 t−µ(a 1 ,t) have been picked whatever the actions of a 1 . This can be showed by induction because at each time step where the picker is a non-manipulator, she will pick the same item as in J −a 1 unless this item has already been picked.
As a consequence of Lemma 3, for each possible set S that can appear at time step t and agent a ∈ A \ {a 1 }, b(a, S) can only be µ(a 1 , t − 1) + 1 different items. More precisely, b(a, S) has to be one of the µ(a 1 , t − 1) + 1 preferred items of a in I \ S t−1 . As a result, the number of possible vectors (b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)) associated to all the possible sets S that can appear at time step t is upper bounded by (µ(a 1 , t − 1) + 1) n−1 . Lastly, by using the facts that each set S ∈ ∆ is characterized by the vector (b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)), that µ(a 1 , t) ≤ µ(a 1 ) for all t, and by considering all possible time steps, we obtain that the number of different sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme can be upper bounded by m(µ(a 1 ) + 1) n−1 .
Theorem 3. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m 3 (µ(a 1 ) + 1) 2n ). As a result, ManipSA is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + µ(a 1 ).
Proof. We use the fact that the number of states involved in our dynamic programming scheme is bounded by m(µ(a 1 )+1) n , as there are at most µ(a 1 )+1 possible values for k and m(µ(a 1 )+1) n−1 possible sets for S in a state (k, S). Using the item representation and Lemma 2, we can hence build the directed acyclic state graph in O(m · m 2 (µ(a 1 ) + 1) 2n ) and then perform backward induction in O(m · m(µ(a 1 ) + 1) n ).
Remark. We highlight the fact that Theorem 3 contrasts with Theorem 1 which implies that the problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter µ(a 1 ).
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + rg max . The number of different sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme is also upper bounded by m(2rg max ) n−2 . This is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For any set S ⊆ I, and any two agents a s , a t ∈ A \ {a 1 }, we have the following inequality:
Proof. If we assume for the sake of contradiction that rk as (b(a s , S)) ≥ rk at (b(a t , S)) + rg max and use the fact that |rk as (b(a t , S)) − rk at (b(a t , S))| < rg max (by definition of rg max ), then we can conclude that b(a t , S) ≻ as b(a s , S), which contradicts the definition of b(a s , S).
Lemma 4 implies that for each of the m possible items for b(a 2 , S), there are only 2rg max − 1 possible items for other parameters b(a j , S) with j > 2. Then, by using the facts that a set S ∈ ∆ is characterized by the vector (b(a 2 , S), . . . , b(a n , S)), we obtain that the number of different sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme can be upper bounded by m(2rg max ) n−2 .
Theorem 4. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m 5 (2rg max ) 2(n−2) ). As a result, ManipSA is FPT w.r.t. parameter n + rg max .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3. We use the fact that the number of states involved in our dynamic programming scheme is bounded by m 2 (2rg max ) n−2 , as there are at most m possible values for k and m(2rg max ) n−2 possible sets for S in a state (k, S). Using the item representation and Lemma 2, we can hence build the directed acyclic state graph in O(m · m 4 (2rg max ) 2(n−2) ) and then perform backward induction in O(m · m 2 (2rg max ) n−2 ).
The algorithm is FPT w.r.t. parameter rg max . Lastly, the number of different sets S involved in our dynamic programming scheme can also be upper bounded by m2 2rg max . This claim is due to the fact that the set S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)) cannot contain an item whose rank w.r.t. a 2 is "too high", which is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Given S ∈ ∆, all i in S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)) verify the following inequalities:
Proof. First note that by definition b(a 2 , S) ∈S (because b(a 2 , S)∈I \ S) and D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S))= {i ∈ I|rk a 2 (i) < rk a 2 (b(a 2 , S))}. Hence, any item i ∈ S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)) verifies rk a 2 (i) ≥ rk a 2 (b(a 2 , S)) + 1.
Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists i ∈ S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)) such that rk a 2 (i) > rk a 2 (b(a 2 , S)) + 2rg max . Because S belongs to ∆, we have that S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)) = a∈A\{a 1 } D(a, b(a, S)) \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)). Hence, there exists a j with j ≥ 3 such that i ∈ D(a j , b(a j , S)). By definition of rg max , we have that rk a j (i) > rk a 2 (i) − rg max which yields that rk a j (b(a j , S)) > rk a j (i) > rk a 2 (i) − rg max > rk a 2 (b(a 2 , S)) + rg max . This contradicts Lemma 4.
As a consequence of Lemma 5, the number of sets S is upper bounded by m2 2rg max , because there are at most m possible items for b(a 2 , S) and for each of them there are at most 2 2rg max possible sets for S \ D(a 2 , b(a 2 , S)).
Theorem 5. Problem ManipSA is solvable in O(m 5 2 4rg max ). As a result, ManipSA is FPT w.r.t. parameter rg max .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 3. We use the fact that the number of states involved in our dynamic programming scheme is upper bounded by m 2 (2 2rg max ), as there are at most m possible values for k and m2 2rg max possible sets for S in a state (k, S). Using the item representation and Lemma 2, we can hence build the directed acyclic state graph in O(m · m 4 (2 4rg max )) and then perform backward induction in O(m · m 2 (2 2rg max )).
Remark. Note that it is easy to prove that, in contrast, the problem is NP-hard even if the average range of the items is of 2. 1 Furthermore, Theorem 4 might seem less appealing as the ManipSA problem is FPT w.r.t. parameter rg max alone. However, we would like to stress that the time complexity of Theorem 4 might be more interesting than the one of Theorem 5 for a small number of agents.
An Upper Bound on the Optimal Value of ManipSA
Our initial hope was that computational complexity could be a barrier to manipulating sequential allocation. Unfortunately, we have seen in the previous section that the ManipSA problem can be solved efficiently in many cases. Another reason that could push agents towards behaving truthfully could be that it would not be worth it. Indeed, if the increase in utility that an agent can get by manipulating is very low, she might be reluctant to gather the necessary information and do the effort of looking for a good manipulation. To the best of our knowledge, the question of how much a manipulator can increase the utility of her bundle is unexplored for the sequential allocation protocol. We thus provide the following tight bound. Theorem 6. The manipulator cannot increase her welfare by a factor greater than or equal to 2, i.e., max ≻ u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) < 2u T and this bound is tight.
Sketch of the proof. The full proof is deferred to Appendix A.1. We proceed by induction on the value of parameter µ(a 1 ). If µ(a 1 ) = 1, the bound is obvious because a 1 cannot manipulate. If µ(a 1 ) = 2, the bound is also easy to prove because a 1 will obtain only two items and the utility of each of them cannot be greater than the one of the first item a 1 picks when behaving truthfully (one having a strictly lower utility). Assume the bound true up to µ(a 1 ) = k − 1 and let us further assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an instance J with µ(a 1 ) = k where max ≻ u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) ≥ 2u T . Moreover, let us denote by x 1 , . . . , x k (resp. y 1 , . . . , y k ) the items picked by a 1 when behaving truthfully (resp. according to one of her best manipulation denoted by ≻ b ), where the items are ordered w.r.t. the time step at which they are picked (e.g., x 1 is picked first when a 1 behaves truthfully). Our hypothesis implies that:
(1)
Consider the instance J ′′ obtained from J by removing the first occurrence of a 1 in π as well as item x 1 . In J ′′ the set of items that a 1 gets when behaving truthfully is x 2 , . . . , x k . We claim that in J ′′ , a 1 can get a set of items Y that includes all items in {y 2 , . . . , y k } up to one item. Hence,
where the second inequality is due to Inequality 1 and the third one is due to fact that u(y i ) ≤ u(x 1 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We obtain a contradiction because µ(a 1 ) = k − 1 in J ′′ . The tightness of the bound is provided by the instance of Example 1 with the following utility function u(i 1 ) = u(i 2 ) + ǫ = u(i 3 ) + 2ǫ = 1 and u(i 4 ) = 0. We recall that in this instance u T = u(i 1 ) + u(i 4 ) = u(i 1 ) whereas the manipulator can obtain by manipulating the set S = {i 2 , i 3 } with utility u(i 2 ) + u(i 3 ) = 2u(i 1 ) − 3ǫ.
We conclude from Theorem 6 that, while the increase in utility of the manipulator cannot be arbitrarily large, manipulating may often be worth it for the manipulator as doubling her utility can be a significant improvement.
An Integer Programming Formulation
In this last section, we provide an integer programming formulation of the ManipSA problem. This integer program provides another tool than the dynamic program of Section 4 to solve the ManipSA problem which may be more efficient for some instances. Moreover, a more thorough analysis of this formulation and of it's solution polytope may lead to new results. For instance, some bounds on the number of variables could yield new parameterized complexity results via Lenstra's theorem [Jr.83].
By abuse of notation, we will identify the set I as the set [m] = {1, . . . , m}. Let x it be a binary variable with the following meaning: x it = 1 iff item i is picked at time step t. Then, the constraint m i=1 x it = 1 implies that there is exactly one item being picked at time step t. Similarly, the constraint m t=1 x it = 1 implies that item i is picked at exactly one time step. Lastly, consider a time step t such that π(t) = a 1 . Then the following set of constraints implies that π(t) picks at time step t the best item available for her.
In words, this constraint says that: if π(t) does not pick item i at time step t (i.e., x it = 0), it is either because she picks something that she prefers (i.e., j≻ π(t) i x jt = 1 ), or because item i has already been picked at an earlier time step (i.e., t ′ <t x it ′ = 1). To summarize, we obtain the following integer programming formulation 2 with m 2 binary variables and at most m 2 constraints (as we can assume the manipulator is the picker for at least two time steps),
Conclusion and Future Work
We have provided a variety of results on the problem of finding an optimal manipulation in the sequential allocation protocol. Beside an integer program to solve this problem, we have designed a dynamic programming algorithm from which we have derived several positive parameterized complexity results. For instance, we have shown that this manipulation problem is in XP with respect to the number of agents and that it is in FPT with respect to the maximum range of an item. Lastly, motivated by the fact that agents could be inclined to behave truthfully if a manipulation would not be worth it, we have investigated an upper bound on the increase in utility that the manipulator could get by manipulating. We have showed that the manipulator cannot increase the utility of her bundle by a factor greater than or equal to 2 and that this bound is tight. Overall, our results show that, not only sequential allocations are worth manipulating, but also that they can be manipulated efficiently for a wide range of instances.
The main open problem following our work is to determine if the problem of finding an optimal manipulation is in FPT w.r.t. the number of agents. Moreover, one could try to decrease our upper bound on the increase in utility that the manipulator can obtain by restricting to specific instances (e.g., imposing a specific type of picking sequences). Lastly, it would be worth investigating the price of manipulation, i.e., the worst case ratio between the social welfare when one agent manipulates, all the others being truthful, and the one when all the agents behave truthfully. On this issue, to the best of our knowledge, little is known except for some preliminary results by Bouveret and Lang [BL14] .
A Appendices
A.1 Complete Proof of Theorem 1 Theorem 1. Determining if there exists a successful manipulation for a 1 is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter µ max .
Proof. We make a reduction from the CLIQUE problem where given a graph G = (V, E) and an integer k, we wish to determine if there exists a clique of size k. This problem is W[1]-hard w.r.t. parameter k. Without loss of generality, we make the assumptions that |V | > k and that |E| > k(k − 1)/2 (because otherwise it is trivial to determine if there is a clique of size k). From an instance of CLIQUE, we create the following ManipSA instance.
Set of agents.
Note that µ max = µ(a 1 ) = k(k+1) 2 + 1.
Utility values of a 1 . The utility function of a 1 is the following one: u(b i ) = 7 + ǫ × i/|V |, u(g {i,j} ) = 4 + ǫ × (min(i, j) × |V | + max(i, j))/|V | 2 , u(m i ) = 2 − ǫ × i/|V | and u(w {i,j} ) = 1 − ǫ × (min(i, j) × |V | + max(i, j))/|V | 4 where ǫ < 2 k(k+1)+2 and vertices are indexed from 1 to |V |.
Idea of the proof. At the end of the vertex round, all the best items are gone as they have already been picked by a 1 or by the vertex agents v i . Similarly, at the end of the edge round, none of the good items are left. Hence, at the third manipulator round, when a 1 picks her last item, the best she can hope for is a medium item. When behaving truthfully, a 1 will pick k best items in her first round and then k(k − 1)/2 good items in her second round (in both cases, the best possible). More generally, she can always pick any set of k best items in her first round and then (whatever the previous k best items) pick any set of k(k − 1)/2 good items in her second round. Note also that, if {b i 1 , . . . , b i k } are the k best items selected by a 1 at the first round, then in the vertex round the agents v i will pick the medium items {m i 1 , . . . , m i k }. Moreover, before the third manipulator round, agents c t will pick additional |V | − k − 1 medium items. So, a medium item is left at the third manipulator round only if none of the edge agents pick a medium item in the edge round. According to her preference ranking, such an agent e {i,j} will not pick a medium item iff g {i,j} is still available, or if g {i,j} , m i and m j have all already been picked. If g {i,j} is one of the k(k − 1)/2 good items that have been already picked at the manipulator second round, then m i and m j have already been picked before, in the vertex round, if b i and b j were already taken in the first manipulator round. In conclusion, none of the medium items are picked by the edge agents iff the k(k − 1)/2 edges e {i,j} for which g {i,j} has already been picked at the second manipulator round have as endpoints only nodes in {v i 1 , . . . , v i k }, and this is possible iff {v i 1 , . . . , v i k } form a clique in the initial graph G. This is proved more formally in the two following lemmata. Lemma 6. If there is a clique of size k, then there exists a preference ranking that allows a 1 to pick k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item.
Proof of Lemma 6. Denote by {i 1 , . . . , i k } a clique of size k of the graph. Let us consider a preference ranking ≻ where items {b it |t ∈ {1, . . . , k}} are ranked first, items {g {i l ,it} |{l, t} ⊂ {1 . . . k}} are ranked second and then medium items {m 1 , . . . , m |V | } directly follow. The rest of the items are ranked below in an arbitrary order. We detail what happens in the different rounds of the picking sequence if a 1 reports ≻ as her preference ranking.
• Manipulator round 1: a 1 picks items {b it |t ∈ {1, . . . , k}}.
• Vertex round: each agent v i gets to pick one item. At the end of this round, all items b i are taken as well as items m it , t = 1, . . . , k.
• Manipulator round 2: a 1 picks items {g {i l ,it} |{l, t} ⊂ {1 . . . k}}.
• Edge round: each agent e {i,j} gets to pick one item. At the end of this round, all items g {i,j} are taken as well as items {w {i l ,it} , |{l, t} ⊂ {1 . . . k}}. Note that no medium item is taken during this round, so there remains |V | − k medium items to be picked.
• Medium item collectors round: each of the |V | − k − 1 agent c t gets to pick one item. As they all pick one medium item, there remains exactly one medium item at the end of this round.
• Manipulator round 3: the manipulator a 1 picks this remaining medium item.
• End round: the remaining items are shared arbitrarily within the non-manipulators such that each of them gets at most one new item.
Lemma 7. If there exists a preference ranking that allows a 1 to pick k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item, then there is a clique of size k.
Proof of Lemma 7. We recall that whatever a 1 does, there are no items b i left the second time she becomes the picker (i.e., at the second manipulator round) and no items g {i,j} left the third time she becomes the picker (i.e., at the third manipulator round). Hence, if a 1 can pick k of the best items and k(k − 1)/2 good items, then these k best items are picked during the first manipulator round and these k(k − 1)/2 good items are picked during the second manipulator round. Hence, if a 1 can pick k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item, then the medium item is picked at the third manipulator round. Let us denote by {b i 1 , . . . , b i k } the k first items a 1 picks. Besides these items, a 1 picks k(k − 1)/2 good items g {s,t} during her second picking round. Let us assume for contradiction that for one of these elements g {s,t} , s or t does not belong to {i 1 , . . . , i k }. Then, in this case, a 1 will not be able to take a medium item the third time she becomes a picker. This is because, in this case, in the vertex round k medium items will be taken, in the edge round at least one more medium item will be taken and finally in the medium item collectors round the remaining ones will be collected. This implies that {i 1 , . . . , i k } is a clique.
Summarizing from Lemmata 6 and 7, there exists a strategy for a 1 making it possible to get k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item iff G has a clique of k nodes. As a result, if the truthful allocation is composed of k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item, then we can conclude that there exists a clique of size k. Otherwise, if the truthful allocation is composed of k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one of the worst items, then we show that there exists a successful manipulation for the manipulator iff there exists a strategy for a 1 making it possible to get k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item. This is proven in Lemmata 8 and 9. Consequently, if we could determine if there exists a successful manipulation, we could solve the CLIQUE problem.
Lemma 8. If the last item picked when behaving truthfully is one of the worst item, then any strategy ≻ that allows a 1 to pick k of the best items, k(k − 1)/2 good items and one medium item is a successful manipulation.
Proof of Lemma 8. The lemma results from the following inequalities:
where the first and third inequalities are due to the fact that:
and the second inequality is due to the fact that ǫ < 2 k(k+1)+2 . Lemma 9. Any strategy ≻ that (1) does not pick only best items in the first manipulator round, or (2) does not pick only good items in the second manipulator round, or (3) does not pick a medium item in the third manipulator round cannot be a successful manipulation.
Proof of Lemma 9. We recall that none of the best items are left at the end of the vertex round and that none of the good items are left at the end of the edge round. We treat each of the three cases of the lemma separately.
Case 1: let us first consider a strategy ≻ which does not pick only best items in the first manipulator round. In this case, we obtain the following inequalities: u t > 7k + 4k(k − 1)/2 + 1 − ǫ > (7 + ǫ)(k − 1) + (4 + ǫ)(k(k − 1)/2 + 1) + 2 > u(φ ≻ (a 1 )).
4 <u(g {i,j} ) ≤ (4 + ǫ) ∀{i, j} ∈ E, (3)
1 − ǫ/|V | 2 ≤u(w {i,j} ) ∀{i, j} ∈ E,
and the second inequality is due to the fact that ǫ < 2 k(k+1)+2 < 4 k(k+1)+2 . Hence, ≻ cannot be a successful manipulation.
Case 2: we now treat the second case where ≻ does not pick only good items in the second manipulator round. In this case, we have the following inequalities: u t > 7k + 4k(k − 1)/2 + 1 − ǫ > (7 + ǫ)k + (4 + ǫ)(k(k − 1)/2 − 1) + 2 × 2 > u(φ ≻ (a 1 )).
where the first and third inequalities are due to inequalities 2 to 5 and the second inequality is due to the fact that ǫ < 2 k(k+1)+2 < 2 k(k+1) . Hence, ≻ cannot be a successful manipulation. Case 3: we now treat the last case where ≻ does not pick a medium item in the third manipulator round. In this case, we have the following inequalities:
where the first inequality is due to the fact that when behaving truthfully, a 1 picks the k best best items in the first manipulator round and then the k(k − 1)/2 best good items in the second manipulator round. Thus, if the manipulator manipulates in one of these two rounds, she will at least lose a utility value of ǫ/|V | 2 . Furthermore, the best she can win from picking one of the worst item instead of another one is upper bounded by a utility value of |V | 2 ǫ/|V | 4 . Hence, ≻ cannot be a successful manipulation.
A.2 Complete Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6 The manipulator cannot increase her welfare by a factor greater than or equal to 2, i.e., max ≻ u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) < 2u T and this bound is tight.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the value of parameter µ(a 1 ). If µ(a 1 ) = 1, the bound is obvious because a 1 cannot manipulate. If µ(a 1 ) = 2, the bound is also easy to prove because a 1 will obtain only two items and the utility of each of them cannot be greater than the one of the first item a 1 picks when behaving truthfully, one having a strictly lower utility. Note that u T > 0 when µ(a 1 ) ≥ 2. Let us assume the bound true up to µ(a 1 ) = k − 1 and let us further assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists an instance J with µ(a 1 ) = k where max ≻ u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) ≥ 2u T . Moreover, let us denote by x 1 , . . . , x k (resp. y 1 , . . . , y k ) the items picked by a 1 when behaving truthfully (resp. according to one of her best manipulation that we denote by ≻ b ), where the items are ordered w.r.t. the time step at which they are picked (e.g., x 1 is picked first when a 1 behaves truthfully). Our hypothesis implies that:
We will now show how to build from J an instance J ′′ with µ(a 1 ) = k − 1 and where max ≻ u(φ ≻ (a 1 )) ≥ 2u T , hence bringing a contradiction. However, for ease of presentation this can get a set of items Y compounded of all items in {y 2 , . . . , y k } up to one item. Hence,
where the second inequality is due to Inequality 6 and the third one is due to fact that u(y i ) ≤ u(x 1 ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We obtain a contradiction because µ(a 1 ) = k − 1 in J ′′ .
The tightness of the bound is provided by the instance of Example 1 with the following utility function u(i 1 ) = u(i 2 ) + ǫ = u(i 3 ) + 2ǫ = 1 and u(i 4 ) = 0. We recall that in this instance u T = u(i 1 ) + u(i 4 ) = u(i 1 ) whereas the manipulator can obtain by manipulating the set S = {i 2 , i 3 } with utility u(i 2 ) + u(i 3 ) = 2u(i 1 ) − 3ǫ.
